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Barbara Richter gets to grips with the serious possibility of a new economic model, finding many ideas that
deserve to be read and discussed.
Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State. Roman Frydman
& Michael D. Goldberg. Princeton University Press. February 2011.
Find this book at: Google Books Amazon LSE Library
More than two years after the economic crisis first loomed its head, the
future of economic policy in the UK and across the world is still heavily
debated. With the IMF now searching for a new Managing Director (the
money seems not to on Gordon Brown however), important discussions
around the relationship between government and the markets will surely
continue.
So why did standard models in financial economics not see the crisis
coming? What can be done to keep a repeat of this crisis from happening?
These are the questions at the heart of Roman Frydman (New York
University) and Michael D. Goldberg’s (University of New Hampshire) book
Beyond Mechanical Markets – Asset Price swings, Risk and the Role of the
State. The authors not only show the insufficiency of current theory, they
also present an alternative, “Imperfect Knowledge Economics”, that aims to
address these issues and give very different policy recommendations from
the ones considered en vogue now.
The first part of the book is devoted to taking apart the rational expectations
hypothesis, today’s dominant assumption in all financial economics. The
hypothesis states that all actors in a market use all information and the
correct economic model to form expectations of the future of the economy in all eternity. This is of course, as
the authors show in great detail, nonsense. The rational expectations hypothesis ignores the fact that no
individual person can have all available information, and much less that everybody can know everything they
need to know. It also ignores that innovation of any kind may alter the way the future economy works,
possibly changing the way forecasts should be made.
The authors’ own “Imperfect Knowledge Economics” addresses these issues, as detailed in the second part
of the book. Frydman and Goldberg provide a theory of forecasting behaviour, the result of decades of
research, that takes into account that some things are unknowable in the present and that market
participants may actually change their forecasting strategy from time to time. Some space is given to
empirical studies that support their theory and a long chapter talks about its policy recommendations: the
state should limit asset price swings. Current measures in the US and in Europe to prevent a repeat of the
financial crisis are viewed favourable, but in the authors’ point of view don’t go far enough.
This book is a bit of a curiosity: its central idea is eminently sensible, to the point where most non-economists
will say “well, yeah, but isn’t that obvious?” (And it really shouldn’t be too surprising to economists either). It
is thorough in its deconstruction of the rational expectations hypothesis and even more thorough in its
description of the new theory. At the same time, it is a tedious read. Most of what the authors have to say in
the first part could be said crisper, thus not wearing out the reader’s patience before the actually really
interesting second part begins. The book is non-technical, both the rational expectations hypothesis and the
“Imperfect Knowledge Economics” are explained without resorting to mathematics. I am not sure, however,
that many non-economists will find the terminology accessible.
The policy recommendations derived from “Imperfect Knowledge Economics” follow logically and consistently
from what the authors describe in the preceding chapters. To work in practice, the recommendations require
public servants and politicians that are immune to lobbying and public opinion and complete honesty on the
part of all market participants. All in all, the ideas in this book deserve to be read and discussed. I just can’t
promise a wholly enjoyable read.
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